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THE VIOLENCE OF PRIVACY
Elizabeth M. Schneider*
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hope-
fully enduring and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is
an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a har-
mony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as
noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions."
I. INTRODUCTION
T HIS symposium celebrates the anniversary of Griswold v. Con-
necticut.2 Griswold has been heralded for introducing a newv era of
possibility for the right to privacy. In the years since .Griswold was
decided, protection of a sphere of family privacy from state interfer-
ence has been viewed as "good." Yet, understood through a lens of
gender, and more particularly shaped by the experiences of battered
women, the concept of privacy is more complex and ambiguous.
The notion of the family as a sphere of privacy, immune from
state interference, is central to Griswold. But Griswold involved a state
law that prohibited contraception and is premised on an idealized vision
of marriage as "enduring and intimate," promoting "harmony in liv-
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School, Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law School,
1991. B.A. 1968 Bryn Mawr College, M.Sc. 1969 The London School of Economies and Political
Science, J.D. 1973 New York University Law School.
This essay was presented at the University of Connecticut Law Review Symposium, The 25th
Anniversary of Griswold v. Connecticut, February 22, 1991. Earlier versions were presented at the
Law and Society Annual Meeting (1990) and the Columbia Seminar on Women and Society
(1990). I am grateful to Sylvia Law and Martha Minow for their comments and support. Brande
Stellings, Kate Nicholson, Marie-Louise Ramsdale, Eve Shapiro, Michele Lang, Rebecca Haile
and Janis Kestenbaum provided valuable research assistance. Students in my Battered Women
and the Law class at Harvard Law School, Spring 1991, helped me explore and dev lop many of
the ideas expressed in this essay. A Brooklyn Law School Faculty Research grant enabled me to
complete it.
1. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
2. 381 U.S. 479.
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ing." For women in the United States, intimacy with men, in and out
of marriage, too often results in violence. The concept of freedom from
state intrusion into the marital bedroom takes on a different meaning
when it is violence that goes on in the marital bedroom. The concept of
marital privacy, established as a constitutional principle in Griswold,
historically has been the key ideological rationale for state refusal to
intervene to protect battered women3 within ongoing intimate relation-
ships. For this reason, at the same time that we celebrate Griswold, we
also must examine its underside: the dark and violent side of privacy.
This essay explores the ways in which concepts of privacy permit,
encourage, and reinforce violence against women, focusing on the com-
plex interrelationship between notions of "public" and "private" in our
social understandings of woman-abuse." Historically, male battering of
women was untouched by law, protected as part of the private sphere
of family life. Over the last twenty years, however, as the battered
women's movement in this country has made issues of battering visible,
battering is no longer perceived as a purely "private" problem and has
taken on dimensions of a "public" issue. There has been an explosion of
legal reform and social service efforts: the development of battered
women's shelters and hotlines, many state and federal governmental re-
ports and much state legislation. New legal remedies for battered
women have been developed which have been premised on the idea of
battering as a "public" harm. However, at the same time, there is
widespread resistance to acknowledgment of battering as a "public" is-
3. This essay uses the terms "battered women," "woman-abuse," and "male battering of
women" interchangeably, although they have different meanings. I have criticized the term "bat-
tered women" as problematic both because it focuses the problem on the woman who is abused,
rather than the battering man, and because it is a static term that defines the woman in a total-
izing and stereotypical way, and connotes helplessness. See generally Schneider, Battered Women:
Reflections on Feminist Theory and Feminist Practice (Nov. 19, 1990) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Connecticut Law Review). In contrast, many activists now use the term "survivor"
to emphasize the strength and resources of women who have been battered. The term "woman-
abuse" is very general but focuses attention on a continuum of physical and verbal abuse. The
phrase "male battering of women" is useful because it describes the problem more accurately, but
is unwieldy.
Although the problem of gay and lesbian violence is serious and important, this essay focuses
on male battering of women. Much of what I discuss is applicable to women who are battered by
other women, but lesbians who have been battered face additional problems which make the ques-
tion of privacy more complex. See generally K. LOBEL, NAMING THE VIOLENCE: SPEAKING OUT
ABOUT LESBIAN BATTERING (1986); Robson, Lavender Bruises: Intra-Lesbian Violence, Law and
Lesbian Legal Theory, 20 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 567 (1990).
4. I use the words "private" and "public" in quotes in order to emphasize that there is no
single natural meaning to the terms, but several socially constructed meanings.
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sue. The ideological tenacity of conceptions of battering as "private" is
revealed in the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in
Deshaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services;5 in the
inadequacy of legal reform efforts to date; and in tensions that exist
within the battered women's movement.
The concept of privacy poses a dilemma and challenge to theoreti-
cal and practical work on woman-abuse. The notion of marital privacy
has been a source of oppression to battered women and has helped to
maintain women's subordination within the family. However, a more
affirmative concept of privacy, one that encompasses liberty, equality,
freedom of bodily integrity, autonomy, and self-determination, is im-
portant to women who have been battered. The challenge is not simply
to reject privacy for battered women and opt for state intervention, but
to develop both a more nuanced theory of where to draw the bounda-
ries between public and private and a theory of privacy that is
empowering.
This essay is an effort to begin a conversation about the complex
role that concepts of privacy do play and might play in work on wo-
man-abuse. It builds on earlier work on the role of law and concepts of
public and private,6 particularly in the area of woman-abuse, and the
affirmative potential of privacy.8 I begin with a brief overview of the
meanings of "public" and "private" in American family life. I then
move to a discussion of three different dimensions of the way in which
notions of privacy affect both theory and practice in this area. First, I
explore current legal reform efforts on behalf of battered women and
examine the persistence of denial of battering as a "public" issue. Sec-
ond, I identify shifting parameters of "public" and "private" in reform
efforts on woman-abuse. Finally, I return to Griswold and argue for the
development of affirmative conceptions of privacy linked to autonomy
to enhance battered women's empowerment.
5. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
6. Taub & Schneider, Perspectives on Women's Subordination and the Role of Law. in THE
POLITICS OF LAw: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 117 (D. Kair's ed. 1982).
7. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Move-
ment, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589, 644-48 (1986) [hereinafter Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights];
See generally Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and The Prob-
lem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S Rrs. L REP. 195 (1986).
8. Schneider, Commentary: The Affirmative Dimensions of Douglas's Privacy. in HE SHALL
NOT PASS THIS WVAY AGAIN: THE LEGACY OF JUSTICE ViL~wi 0. DOUGLAS 179 (S. Vasby ed.
1991) [hereinafter Schneider, Commentary].
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. II. PRIVACY: THE MEANINGS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
Historically, the dichotomy of "public" and "private" has been
viewed as an important construct for understanding gender. The tradi-
tional notion of "separate spheres" is premised on a dichotomy between
the "private" world of family and domestic life (the "women's"
sphere), and the "public" world of marketplace (the "men's" sphere).9
Nadine Taub and I have discussed elsewhere the difference between
the role of law in the public and private spheres.10 In the public sphere,
sex-based exclusionary laws join with other institutional and ideological
constraints to directly limit women's participation."" In the private
sphere, the legal system operates more subtly. The law claims to be
absent in the private sphere and has historically refused to intervene in
ongoing family relations.12
Tort law, which is generally concerned with injuries inflicted
on individuals, has traditionally been held inapplicable to inju-
ries inflicted by one family member on another. Under the
doctrines of interspousal and parent-child immunity, courts
have consistently refused to allow recoveries for injuries that
would be compensable but for the fact that they occurred in
the private realm. In the same way, criminal law fails to pun-
ish intentional injuries to family members. Common law and
statutory definitions of rape in most states continue to carve
out a special exception for a husband's forced intercourse with
his wife. Wife beating was initially omitted from the definition
of criminal assault on the ground that a husband had the right
to chastise his wife. Even today, after courts have explicitly
rejected the definitional exception and its rationale, judges,
prosecutors, and police officers decline to enforce assault laws
in the family context. 3
Although a dichotomous view of the public sphere and the private
sphere has some heuristic value, and considerable rhetorical power, the
dichotomy is overdrawn. 4 The notion of a sharp demarcation between
9. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARv. L,
REv. 1497, 1499-1501 (1983).
10. Taub & Schneider, supra note 6, at 117.
11. Id. at 121.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 121-22.
14. Kerber, Separate Spheres, Female Worlds, Women's Place: The Rhetoric of Women's
History, 75 J. AM. HisT. 9, 17 (1988).
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public and private has been widely rejected by feminist and Critical
Legal Studies scholars.1 5 There is no realm of personal and family life
that exists totally separate from the reach of the state. The state de-
fines both the family, the so-called private sphere, and the market, the
so-called public sphere. "Private" and "public" exist on a continuum.
Thus, in the so-called private sphere of domestic and family life,
which is purportedly immune from law, there is always the selective
application of law. Significantly, this selective application of law in-
vokes "privacy" as a rationale for immunity in order to protect male
domination. For example, when the police do not respond to a battered
woman's call for assistance, or when a civil court refuses to evict her
assailant, the woman is relegated to self-help, while the man who beats
her receives the law's tacit encouragement and support.10 Indeed, we
can see this pattern in recent legislative and prosecutorial efforts to
control women's conduct during pregnancy in the form of "fetal" pro-
tection laws. These laws are premised on the notion that women's
childbearing capacity, and pregnancy itself, subjects women to public
regulation and control. Thus, pregnant battered women may find them-
selves facing criminal prosecution for drinking liquor, but the man who
battered them is not prosecuted.17
15. See Freeman and Mensch, The Public-Private Distinction in American Law and Life. 36
Burr. L. Rav. 237 (1987); Minow, Adjudicating Differences. Conflicts Among Feminist Lawyers.
in CoNFucrs IN FaNISM 156-60 (M. Hirsh & E. Fox Keller eds. 1990); Symposium, The Pub-
lic/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1289 (1982).
16. Olsen, supra note 9, at 1507 n.39, 1537.
17. The dichotomy of women as private/men as public changes when women are viewed as
childbearers. In Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908), the Supreme Court emphasized that
"as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of women becomes
an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race."
Several recent cases involving battered pregnant women dramatize the contrast between the
treatment of pregnant women and battering men. A pregnant woman in Wisconsin who sought
medical care for injuries she sustained as a result of a beating by her partner was subsequently
arrested and charged with criminal child abuse for drinking during pregnancy. Pregnancy Police
Active in Wyoming, Michigan, and Massachusetts, REPRODUCTnOn Rs. UPDATm, Feb. 2, 1990,
at 3.4 (published by the ACLU and the Reproduction Freedom Project, New York, N.Y.), Feb.
2, 1990, at 3-4. Diane Pfannensteil of Laramie, Wyoming was arrested for drinking while preg-
nant and charged with felony child abuse when she went to the hospital to be treated for bruises
suffered from her husband choking and beating her. Goodman, Being Pregnant. Addicted. It's a
Crime, The Boston Globe, Feb. 11, 1991, at 12. In Massachusetts, Josephine Pellegrini was prose-
cuted for allegedly taking cocaine while she was pregnant. Ms. Pellegrini, who was charged when
she took her six-week-old infant to the hospital for burn injuries on his toes, was described in news
reports as "a battered woman who was terrified of [her live-in-boyfriend]," who was also the
father of her three children, and a suspect in the abuse of her infant son. Kennedy, Cloudy Future
After Infant-Cocaine Case: DA Rejects Vision of Legal Morass, The Boston Globe, Aug. 23,
1989, Metro at 1.
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The rhetoric of privacy that has insulated the female world from
the legal order sends an important ideological message to the rest of
society. It devalues women and their functions and says that women
are not important enough to merit legal regulation. 18
This message is clearly communicated when particular
relief is withheld. By declining to punish a man for inflicting
injuries on his wife, for example, the law implies she is his
property and he is free to control her as he sees fit. Women's
work is discredited when the law refuses to enforce the man's
obligation to support his wife, since it implies she makes no
contribution worthy of support. Similarly, when courts decline
to enforce contracts that seek to limit or specify the extent of
the wife's services, the law implies that household work is not
real work in the way that the type of work subject to contract
in the public sphere is real work. These are important
messages, for denying woman's humanity and the value of her
traditional work are key ideological components in maintain-
ing woman's subordinate status. The message of women's in-
feriority is compounded by the totality of the law's absence
from the private realm. In our society, law is for business and
other important things. The fact that the law in general claims
to have so little bearing on women's day-to-day concerns re-
flects and underscores their insignificance. Thus, the legal or-
der's overall contribution to the devaluation of women is
greater than the sum of the negative messages conveyed by
individual legal doctrines.'
Definitions of "private" and "public" in any particular legal con-
text can and do constantly shift. Meanings of "private" and "public"
are based on social and cultural assumptions of what is valued and im-
portant, and these assumptions are deeply gender-based. Thus, the in-
terrelationship between what is understood and experienced as "pri-
vate" and "public" is particularly complex in the area of gender, where
the rhetoric of privacy has masked inequality and subordination. The
decision about what we protect as "private" is a political decision that
always has important "public" ramifications. 20
18. Taub & Schneider, supra note 6, at 122.
19. Id. at 122-23.
20. Michelman, Private, Personal But Not Split: Radin v. Rorty, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1783,
1794 (1990).
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In general, privacy has been viewed as problematic by feminist
theorists. 1 Privacy has seemed to rest on a division of public and pri-
vate that has been oppressive to women and has supported male domi-
nance in the family. Privacy reinforces the idea that the personal is
separate from the political; privacy also implies something that should
be kept secret. Privacy inures to the benefit of the individual, not the
community. The right of privacy has been viewed as a passive right,
one which says that the state cannot intervene. 22
However, some feminist theorists have also explored the affirma-
tive role that privacy can play for women.23 Privacy is important to
women in many ways. It provides an opportunity for individual self-
development, for individual decisionmaking and for protection against
endless caretaking. 24 In addition, there are other related aspects of pri-
vacy, such as the notion of autonomy, equality, liberty, and freedom of
bodily integrity, that are central to women's independence and well-
being. For women who have been battered, these aspects of privacy are
particularly important. In the following sections, I explore three dimen-
sions of privacy in work on battered women that are aspects of this
broader feminist critique. First, I examine how the legacy of viewing
male battering of women as a "private" problem leads to denial of the
seriousness of the problem. Second, I explore ways in which views of
battering as "private" persist despite growing recognition of battering
as a "public" problem. Finally, I speculate on ways that concepts of
privacy might be used affirmatively to empower battered women, rather
than support abuse.
III. DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY
A. The Denial of Power and the Power of Denial
The battered women's movement grew out of the rebirth of the
women's movement in the 1960s, and it is one of the areas in which the
women's movement has made an enduring contribution to law. Like
sexual harassment, the "problem" of battering and the social and legal
construct of a "battered woman" did not exist in this country until the
21. C. MACKINNON. TOWARD A FEumN THEORY OF THE STATE (1989); Cop:lon. Unpack-
ing Patriarchy: Reproduction, Sexuality. OriginallSm and Constitutional Change. in A LESS
THAN PERFECT UNION: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE US. CONSTITUTION 303 (J. Lobel
ed. 1988); Minow, supra note 15.
22. Copelon, supra note 21.
23. A. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY (1988).
24. Id. at 70-72.
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women's movement named it.25 The battered women's movement re-
vealed to the public hidden and private violence. Over the last 20 years,
the battered women's movement has been involved in efforts to provide
services for battered women, to create legal remedies to end abuse, and
to develop public education efforts to change consciousness about bat-
tering. The battered women's movement saw battering as an aspect of
fundamental gender relations, as a reflection of male power and female
stbordination. 8
As a result of the battered women's movement during the last two
decades, the general problem of domestic violence and the more specific
problems of battered women have entered public consciousness in the
United States. The severe problems that battered women face have
been documented by government reports,27 legal and social science
literature,28 and media reports, including front-page headlines, cover-
age of trials and television programs.2 9 State30 and federal31 legislative
25. For a discussion of the history and development of the battered women's movement, see
S. SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISION AND STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED
WOMEN'S MOVEMENT (1982).
26. Id. at 43-52. According to feminist analysis of women battering, violence has traditionally
been a means of maintaining control over women as a class by men as a class: "When a husband
uses violence against his wife, people often view this as a random, irrational act. In contrast,
feminists define wife abuse as a pattern that becomes understandable only through examination of
the social context. Our society is structured along the dimensions of gender: Men as a class wield
power over women." Bograd, Feminist Perspectives on Wife Abuse: An Introduction, in FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 14 (K. Yllo & M. Bograd eds. 1988) [hereinafter FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES].
27. See generally ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE U.S., DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE ON FAM-
ILY VIOLENCE. FINAL REPORT (1984); UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDER THE
RULE OF THUMB; BATTERED WOMEN AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1982); NATIONAL
INST. OF JUSTICE, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONFRONTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A GUIDE FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AGENCIES (1986); The Family Violence Prevention and Services Act: A Report to Con-
gress (August 1988); P. FINN & S. COLSON, CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS: LEGISLATION, CURRENT
COURT PRACTICE, AND ENFORCEMENT (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Nat'l Inst. of Justice, March 1990).
28. Examples of recent books on woman-abuse include J. BLACKMUN, INTIMATE VIOLENCE
(1989); FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 26; DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL (D. Sonkin ed.
1987); E. GONDOLF & E. FISHER, BATTERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS, (1988); L. GORDON, HEROES
OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE; L. HOFF, BATTERED
WOMEN As SURVIVORS (1990); E. PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY (1987); L. WALKER, TERRIFYING
LOVE (1989).
29. For a discussion of popular media images of woman-abuse, see Minow, Words and the
Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1665
(1990).
30. For a discussion of the range of state legislation that has been developed to assist battered
women, see Schneider, Legal Reform Efforts to Assist Battered Women: Past, Present and Future
(1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Connecticut Law Review). For an analysis of
state legislation regarding restraining orders, see Finn, Statutory Authority in the Use and En-
[Vol. 23:973
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reforms have focused on improving the legal remedies available to bat-
tered women, and many battered women's shelters, hotlines, advocacy
programs, and support services for battered women have been
developed.32
Domestic violence is the leading cause of injury to women in the
United States.33 According to FBI statistics, one woman in the United
States is beaten every 18 seconds. a4 Between 2000 and 4000 women die
every year from abuse.35 Thirty percent of all women killed every year
are slain by their partners.36 Battering of women by their husbands or
men with whom they are in an intimate relationship cuts across racial,
class, ethnic and economic lines.37 Police involvement, nationally, in
cases of domestic violence exceeds involvement in murder, rape and all
forms of aggravated assault.
Woman-abuse is an aspect of the basic gender inequality built into
the very fabric of American family law. Myths concerning battered
women, for example, that they provoke and like the violence, are wide-
spread.38 The police and the courts have historically failed to intervene
forcement of Civil Protection Orders Against Domestic Abuse, 23 FAL LQ. 43 (1989).
31. Major federal legislation on domestic violence includes The Victims of Crime Act of 1989
(VOCA), 42 U.S.C. § 10601 (1989), that offers compensation to victims of domestic violence, and
The Family Violence Prevention Services Act, 42 U.S.C. § 10410 (1989) (now The Child Abuse
Protection Adoption and Family Services Act of 1988), that assists states in providing services to
prevent family violence, and coordinates research, training and clearinghouse activities. Senator
Biden has proposed federal legislation on rape and domestic violence in the Violence Against
Women Act of 1991, which is presently being debated in Congress. See S. 15, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991).
32. For a discussion of the range of services available for battered women, see Schneider,
supra note 30, at 59-64.
33. Women, Violence, and the Law: Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on Children,
Youth and Families, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1987) (statement of Rep. George Miller).
34. Report of the Gender Bias Study of the Supreme Judicial Court, 23 SurroL U.L. REv.
576, 584 (1989) [hereinafter Gender Bias Study].
35. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVEsTIGATION, US. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. UNIFORt CmRiE RE-
PORTS FOR 1983 (1984).
36. See Gender Bias Study, supra note 34, at 584.
37. ATTORNEY GEN. OF THE US. DEP'T OF JuSTIcE, TASK FORCE ON FAmuLy VIOLENCE. FI-
NAL REPORT 11 (1986). For a discussion of problems faced by women of color who have been
battered, see Allard, Rethinking Battered Woman Syndrome: A Black Feminist Perspective, I
UCLA WOMEN's LJ. 191 (1991); Crenshaw, Beyond Patriarchy and Racism: Black Feminism
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L REv. (forthcoming 1991); Rasche, Minority
Women and Domestic Violence: The Unique Dilemmas of Battered Women of Color, 2 J. Cox-
TEMP. CRI. JUST. 4 (1986); and Richie, Battered Black Women.: A Challenge for the Black
Community, 16 THE BLACK SCHOLAR 40 (1985).
38. For a discussion of the historical roots of blaming the victim of domestic violence, see
L. GORDON, supra note 28, at 281-88.
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to protect battered women because battering is perceived as a "private"
problem, neither serious nor criminal. When the battered women's
movement began, battered women had, effectively, no legal remedies.3 9
Over the last twenty years, there has been considerable change.
There are now a wide range of groups and organizations that have
emerged around the country to assist battered women. These groups
have developed a range of approaches. They have focused their efforts
on providing services to battered women, by founding shelters for bat-
tered women, setting up telephone hotlines, challenging police practices
that fail to intervene effectively to protect battered women, and work-
ing to advance legislation that offers legal remedies for battered
women. Some groups also have developed programs to work with bat-
tering men.40
Today there is greater public familiarity with these problems. Fed-
eral and state task forces have recommended reforms of legal, social
welfare and health care systems.41 Lawsuits have resulted in improved
police and court practices. Lawsuits against the police have compelled
police departments to arrest batterers vigorously.42 Almost all states
now have domestic violence legislation providing for orders of protec-
tion for women, and legal sanctions for their violation and/or criminal
remedies for battering.43 In short, there has been an explosion of law
reform efforts to assist battered women.
Work on issues of battered women is now at a turning point. Some
reforms have been institutionalized, and problems of battered women
have achieved credibility and visibility. To some degree, a public di-
mension to the problem is now recognized. However, federal, state and
private funding resources put into these reform efforts have been small.
39. For an overview of the development of the battered women's movement, see S.
SCHECHTER, supra note 25, at 53-112. For an overview of model advocacy groups across the
country, see Schneider, supra note 30, at 102-08.
40. For a discussion of batterer's programs and the reasons why men batter, see Ptacek, Why
Do Men Batter Their Wives? in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 26, at 133-56; and Adams,
Treatment Models of Men Who Batter: A Profeminist Analysis, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 26, at 176-96.
41. See Schneider, supra note 30, at 20-24.
42. See, e.g., Thurman v. Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1527-28 (D. Conn. 1984); Bruno v.
Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 1049, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 976 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 64 A.D.2d 582, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978), a.07d, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393
N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979); Nearing v. Weaver, 295 Or. 702, 704, 670 P.2d 137, 139
(1983); but see DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 409 U.S. 189 (1989).
43. See Finn, supra note 30, at 60-73, for an overview of civil restraining legislation enacted
across the country.
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There has been little change in the culture of female subordination that
supports and maintains abuse. At the same time, there is a serious
backlash to these reform efforts and many of the reforms that have
been accomplished are in serious jeopardy. For the last several years,
while writing a report on national legal reform efforts for battered
women for The Ford Foundation) 4 I have been amazed at the enor-
mous accomplishments of the battered women's movement over the last
20 years. Indeed, I can think of few recent social movements that have
accomplished so much in such a short time.
However, I have also been stunned by the depth of social resis-
tance to change. Although battering has evolved from a "private" to a
more "public" issue, it has not become a serious political issue, pre-
cisely because it has profound implications for all of our lives."8 Bat-
tering is deeply threatening. It goes to our most fundamental assump-
tions about the nature of intimate relations and the safeness of family
life. The concept of male battering of women as a "private" issue ex-
erts a powerful ideological pull on our consciousness because, in some
sense, it is something that we would like to believe.'6 By seeing woman-
abuse as "private," we affirm it as a problem that is individual, that
only involves a particular male-female relationship, and for which there
is no social responsibility to remedy. Each of us needs to deny the seri-
ousness and pervasiveness of battering, but more significantly, the in-
terconnectedness of battering with so many other aspects of family life
and gender relations. Instead of focusing on the batterer, we focus on
the battered woman, scrutinize her conduct, examine her pathology and
blame her for not leaving the relationship, in order to maintain that
denial and refuse to confront the issues of power. Focusing on the wo-
man, not the man, perpetuates the power of patriarchy. Denial supports
and legitimates this power; the concept of privacy is a key aspect of
this denial.
Denial takes many forms and operates on many levels.' 7 Men deny
44. Schneider, supra note 30.
45. Bunch, Global Feminism, Human Rights and Sexual Violence, in Fr-ST AN'UAL
WOMEN'S POUCY RESEARCH CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 74 (Institute for Women's Policy Re-
search, May 1989).
46. For an exploration of the phenomenon of denial and the importance of naming violence
generally, see Kelly, How Women Define Their Experiences of Violence, in FEs-uNTs PERSPEC-
Tivas, supra note 26, at 114-31.
47. Martha Mahoney's discussion of the problem of denial in Mahoney, Legal Images of Bat-
tered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICHL L REv. (forthcoming 1991). was
very helpful to me in writing this section.
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battering in order to protect their own privilege. Women need to deny
the pervasiveness of the problem so as not to link it to their own life
situations. Individual women who are battered tend to minimize the
violence in order to distance themselves from some internalized nega-
tive concept of "battered woman." I see denial in the attitudes of ju-
rors, who try to remove themselves and say that it could never happen
to me; if it did, I would handle it differently.48 I see denial in the public
engagement in the Hedda Nussbaum/Joel Steinberg case which fo-
cused on Hedda Nussbaum's complicity, and involved feminists in ac-
tive controversy over the boundaries of victimization.49 The findings of
the many state task force reports on gender bias in the courts have
painstakingly recorded judicial attitudes of denial.5 0 Clearly, there is
serious denial of the part of state legislators, members of Congress and
the Executive Branch who never mention battering as an important
public issue. In battering, we see both the power of denial and the de-
nial of power. The concept of privacy is an ideological rationale for this
denial and serves to maintain it.
The concept of privacy encourages, reinforces and supports vio-
lence against women. Privacy says that violence against women is im-
mune from sanction, that it is permitted, acceptable and part of the
basic fabric of American family life. Privacy says that what goes on in
the violent relationship should not be the subject of state or community
48. For a discussion of jury attitudes toward battered women, see Bochnak, Krauss, McPher-
son, Sternberg & Wiley, Case Preparation and Development, in WOMEN'S SELF-DEFENSE CASES:
THEORY AND PRACTICE (E. Bochnak ed. 1981); Koonan & Waller, Jury Selection in a Woman's
Self-Defense Case, CACJ/FoRuM May-June 1989 at 18; Note, Juror Misconduct and Juror
Composition, 18 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 589, 598 (1988).
49. The Joel Steinberg/Hedda Nussbaum case involved the murder of their adopted daughter,
Lisa Steinberg, who was beaten to death by Joel Steinberg. This case focused on examination of
Hedda Nussbaum as both a victim of abuse and a neglectful mother. See Sullivan, Defense Tries
to Show Nussbaum Liked Pain, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1988, at B2, col. 5. Some feminist response
to the case centered on Hedda Nussbaum's "complicity," and not upon Joel Steinberg's terroriza-
tion of the family:
Systematic battering combined with misguided, though culturally inculcated, notions of
love is not a sufficient excuse to exonerate Hedda Nussbaum from her share of culpability
in Lisa Steinberg's death. . . . When decent, honorable women insist that a piece of
Hedda Nussbaum resides us all, they give the Joel Steinbergs of this world far too much
credit and far too much power. More insidiously, they perpetuate the specious notion that
women are doomed to be victims of the abnormal psychology of love at all cost.
Brownmiller, Hedda Nussbaum, Hardly a Heroine, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1989, at A25, col. 1.
50. See, e.g., Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, 15 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 11 (1986); First Year Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Task Force on Women
in the Courts, 9 WOMEN'S Rrs. L. REP. 129 (1986); Report of the Gender Bias Study of the
Court System in Massachusetts, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 745 (1990).
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intervention. Privacy says that it is an individual, and not a systemic
problem. Privacy operates as a mask for inequality, protecting male
violence against women.
B. The Shifting Parameters of Private and Public
As work on battered women has evolved, social meanings of what
is private and public, and the relationship between them, have become
more complex. Traditionally, battering has been viewed as within the
private sphere of the family, and therefore unprotected by law. Yet, as
Martha Minow has suggested, this social failure to intervene in male
battering of women on grounds of privacy should not be seen as sepa-
rate from the violence, but as part of the violence.
When clerks in a local court harass a woman who applies for a
restraining order against the violence in her home, they are
part of the violence. Society is organized to permit violence in
the home; it is organized through images in mass media and
through broadly based social attitudes that condone violence.
Society permits such violence to go unchallenged through the
isolation of families and the failures of police to respond. Pub-
lic, rather than private patterns of conduct and morals are im-
plicated. Some police officers refuse to respond to domestic vi-
olence; some officers themselves abuse their spouses. Some
clerks and judges think domestic violence matters do not be-
long in court. These failures to respond to domestic violence
are public, not private, actions."1
Although social failure to respond to problems of battered women
has been justified on grounds of privacy, this failure to respond is an
affirmative political decision that has serious public consequences. The
rationale of privacy masks the political nature of the decision. Privacy
thus plays a particularly subtle and pernicious ideological role in sup-
porting, encouraging, and legitimating violence against women. The
state plays an affirmative role in permitting violence against battered
women by protecting the privileges and prerogatives of battering men
and failing to protect battered women, and by prosecuting battered
women for homicide when they protect themselves. These failures to
respond, or selective responses, are part of "public patterns of conduct
and morals. 52
51. Minow, supra note 29, at 1671-72.
52. Id.
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Over the last several years, the meaning of what has been tradi-
tionally viewed as public and private, concerning issues of battered
women, has shifted. In some sense, a public dimension of the problem
has increased. There are now legal decisions that have held police
forces liable for money damages for failure to intervene to protect bat-
tered women, an explosion of state legal remedies to protect battered
women, and federal legislation to assist battered women in implement-
ing remedies. All of these approaches suggest a more public dimension
to the problem, or at least a recognition by governmental bodies, speak-
ing with a public voice, that they must acknowledge and deal with the
problem. Some of the rhetoric surrounding issues of violence against
women has shifted from the language of private to the language of
public.
However, at the same time, the notion of family violence as within
the private sphere has been given additional support by the Supreme
Court's recent decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department
of Social Services.5 3 In DeShaney, the Supreme Court held that the
state had no affirmative responsibility to protect a child who had been
permanently injured as a result of abuse committed by his custodial
father, even when the state had been investigating the child abuse for
several years . 4 The majority opinion reflects a crabbed view of the
world that reasserts a bright-line distinction between public and pri-
vate. Family violence is private and therefore immune from state scru-
tiny because, implicitly, the state had no business to be there in the
first place and no responsibility to intervene at all. Deshaney revives the
notion that family violence is private and the distinction between public
and private action places this violence beyond public control.?
DeShaney is already being interpreted by courts around the country to
limit police liability in suits brought by battered women.56
53. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
54. Id. at 200-02.
55. For a thoughtful analysis of DeShaney, se Minow, supra note 29, at 1666-76.
56. DeShaney has made it difficult for victims of woman-abuse to bring section 1983 claims
against the state for failure to protect them from battering. Courts are rejecting substantive duo
process claims, which are typically based on the alleged existence of a "special relationship" be-
tween the victims and the state (whether as a result of previous knowledge of the harm they faced
at the hands of their abusers or because the state had issued a protective order), as incompatible
with DeShaney. See, e.g., Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 700 (9th Cir. 1990);
Luster v. Price, No. 90-0115-CV-W-8, at 10, (W.D. Mo. July 5, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist. file); Hynson v. City of Chester, 731 F. Supp. 1236, 1239 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Dudosh v. City of
Allentown, 722 F. Supp. 1233, 1235 (E.D. Pa. 1989). Only in two cases involving battering men
who were arguably more "public" actors, where batterers were either close friends of the police
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The tension between public and private also is seen in the issue of
what legal processes are available to battered women, and the social
meaning of those processes to battered women, in particular, and to
society at large.5" Over the last several years, the range of legal reme-
dies has expanded and there has been an explosion of statutory re-
forms. For example, there are civil remedies, known as restraining or-
ders or orders of protection. These are court orders with flexible
provisions that a battered woman can obtain to stop a man from beat-
ing her, prevent him from coming to the house, or evict him from the
house." There are also criminal statutes that provide for the arrest of
batterers, either for beating or for violation of protective orders.5 9 Al-
though there remain serious problems in the enforcement and imple-
mentation of these orders, the fact that such formal legal processes ex-
ist is evidence of a developing understanding of the public dimension of
the problem. By giving battered women remedies in court there is, at
least theoretically, public scrutiny, public control and the possibility of
public sanction. In addition, some states impose marriage license fees
chief, Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 53 (8th Cir. 1990) (plaintiff alleged that the husband
was a close friend of the police chief and the chief in fact directed other police officers not to
intervene on behalf of the wife), or a member of the police force himself, Muhammed v. City of
Chicago, No. 89-C-6903 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file) have dis-
trict courts held that plaintiffs should be given the opportunity to prove a duty-to-protect claim.
But see Borgmann, Battered Women's Substantive Due Process Claims: Can Orders of Protection
Deflect DeShaney, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1280, 1314-17 (1990) (arguing that issuance of protective
orders should overcome DeShaney). One court has held, post-DeShaney, that a court's protective
order issued pursuant to Pennsylvania's Protection from Abuse Act might create a property inter-
est in police protection. Coffman v. Wilson Police Dep't, 739 F. Supp. 257, 264 (F.D. Pa. 1990).
As a result of the diminishing availability, after DeShaney, of section 1983 due process
claims based on the notion of a special relationship, battered women may have to turn to alterna-
tive theories to sue the state for its failure to protect them. Such theories include equal protection
violations, claims that the state has failed adequately to train its agents in domestic violence situa-
tions, or claims based on state tort law. Some courts dismissing section 1983 special relationship
claims at least have been willing to permit plaintiffs the opportunity to bring such claims. See.
e.g., Balistreri, 901 F.2d at 701-702; Freeman, 911 F.2d at 55 (permitting plaintiff to pursue an
equal protection claim); Hynson, 731 F. Supp. at 1240-41; Dudosh, 722 F. Supp. at 1236 (permit-
ting plaintiff to pursue an equal protection claim based on city's failure to train adequately its
police force). See generally Note, Battered Women Suing Police for Failure to Intervene: Viable
Legal Avenues After DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 75 COR-
NELL L. REv. 1393 (1990) (arguing that, post-DeShaney, battered women's best chances of suing
state actors for failure to intervene lie with due process suits not dependent on a special relation-
ship theory, such as a state failure to train, equal protection challenges, and state tort theories).
57. For a discussion of the social meaning of rights claims, see Schneider, The Dialectic of
Rights, supra note 7, at 623-48.
58. See Finn, supra note 30, at 43-44.
59. Bud, Mandatory Arrest for Domestic Violence, II HARV. Wo.iEN's i. 213, 214-15
(1988).
1991]
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
to generate funds to be used for battered women's services, thus mak-
ing an important statement about the public impact of purportedly pri-
vate conduct as well as implying an important ideological link between
marriage and violence.60 On the other hand, some of these extensive
state statutory provisions have been challenged by battering men on
constitutional grounds, including invasion of rights to marital privacy.
61
At the same time that these remedies have been developing, there
has been a move towards more private and informal processes, notably
mediation. Most battered women's advocates are critical of mediation,
because they believe that informal modes of dispute resolution substan-
tially hurt battered women who are disadvantaged with respect to
power, money and resources.6 2 Mediation is viewed as signaling that
battering is the women's individual and private "problem" that should
60. Mo. REv. STAT. § 455.205 (Supp. 1989) authorizes a surcharge of $10.00 in each mar-
riage dissolution case for domestic violence shelters. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-284 (1989)
provides that 80 percent of monies gathered for marriage licenses shall be deposited in a domestic
violence shelter fund. MINN. STAT. § 357.021 (1990) provides that a portion of the marriage
dissolution fee shall be used for emergency shelter and support services to battered women.
61. For constitutional challenges to some of the marriage license fee provisions, see Browning
v. Corbett, 153 Ariz. 74, 734 P.2d 1030 (1987); Boynton v. Kusper, 112 1ll.2d 356, 494 N.E.2d
135 (1986); Crocker v. Finley, 99 Ill.2d 444, 459 N.E.2d 1346 (1984); Villars v. Provo, 440
N.W.2d 160 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
Griswold has been raised as a defense by men to marital rape on the ground that it protects
marital privacy. These challenges have been rejected by courts. In Commonwealth v. Shoemaker,
359 Pa. Super. I 11, 518 A.2d 591 (1986), the court rejected the defendant's privacy challenge on
the ground that the right to privacy should be overridden by the compelling state interest protect-
ing the "fundamental right of all individuals to control the integrity of his or her body." Id. at
116, 518 A.2d at 594. Other cases involving privacy challenges to marital rape have taken a
stronger position, suggesting that marital privacy was never intended to cover nonconsensual acts.
Williams v. State, 494 So. 2d 819, 828-29 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d
152, 165, 474 N.E.2d 567, 574, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207, 214 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020
(1985). Significantly, in rejecting this argument, some courts drew analogies to woman-abuse,
with one court suggesting that "U]ust as a husband cannot invoke a right of marital privacy to
escape liability for beating his wife, he cannot justifiably rape his wife under the guise of a right
to privacy." Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 165, 474 N.E.2d at 574, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 214. See also
Merton v. State, 500 So. 2d 1301, 1304 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); State v. Rider, 449 So. 2d 903,
906 n.6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). But see People v. Forman, 145 Misc. 2d 115, 121, 546
N.Y.S.2d 755, 760 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1989), where the defendant argued that his associational
liberty interests protected by Griswold were violated by the issuance of a temporary order of
protection.
62. See M. SUN & L. WOODS, A MEDIATOR'S GUIDE TO DoMEsTIc ABUSE (1989); Hart, Gen-
tle Jeopardy: The Further Endangerment of Battered Women and Children in Custody Media-
tion, 7 MEDIATION Q. 317 (1990); Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact
of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 57 (1984). For a more general
analysis of the problems with mediation for women, see Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Pro-
cess Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991).
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be "worked out," and that the state has no role.6 3 A general mood in
legal circles, in favor of alternative dispute resolution and less adver-
sarial forms of problem solving, has helped to legitimate mediation and
obscure its problematic implications in this circumstance." However, it
is more accurate to see the move to mediation and more informal
processes as a reflection of the low priority accorded family law issues,
generally, and battered women's problems, in particular, by the law.6"
Recently, the importance of criminal remedies for battering, par-
ticularly mandatory arrest provisions, has been increasingly recog-
nized. 6  Activists have argued that criminal remedies, generally, and
mandatory arrest, in particular, are important remedies that send a
clear social message that battering is impermissible, and, because crim-
inal remedies are prosecuted by the state, give more public force to the
sanction. However, even civil remedies, such as orders of protection and
tort suits against batterers, initiated by individual women against indi-
vidual men, can send a social message. These lawsuits use formal court
process, are subject to public scrutiny, and the legal decisions arrived at
in those cases also make a public statement. In particular, the tort ac-
tion may carry a greater social meaning in light of the demise of the
historic bar of interspousal immunity, the social dimension of the
claimed harm, and the affirmative nature of the claim for damages. 7
Other examples of alternative procedural frameworks that carry more
public meaning include the articulation of battering as a civil rights
violation, 68 an international human rights violation,69 and as involun-
63. Lerman, supra note 62, at 84-89.
64. Id. at 88-89.
65. Id.
66. Buel, supra note 59, at 215-16.
67. For analysis of the developing area of domestic violence and torts, see L. Karp & C. Karp,
Spousal Abuse, in DOMEsTIC TORTS: FAwLY VIOLENCE. CONFLICT AND SEXUAL ABUSE (1989);
DC Court Declines to Recognize Independent Tort of 'Spouse Abuse,' 15 Fain. L Rep. (BNA)
1501, 1502 (Aug. 29, 1989); Victim of Battered Woman's Syndrome Recovers In A Civil Action
for Battery and Emotional Distress, 33 A. TRIAL LAW. ASS'N L REP. 314 (Sept. 1990).
68. Lawyers in some states are exploring whether their civil rights statutes can be interpreted
to cover domestic violence. See MASS. GEm. L. ANN. ch. 265, § 37 (West 1990); NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 10:5-1-10:5-42 (West 1976 & Supp. 1991) (the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination). The
proposed Violence Against women Act of 1991, supra note 31, also defines gender bias as a civil
rights violation in Title III of the Act.
69. For discussion of domestic violence as an international human rights violation, see Baer,
Human Rights at the United Nations: Women's Rights.are Human Rights, 24 IN BRIEF, Nov.
1989, at 1; Heise, Crimes of Gender, WORLD WATCH, Mar.-Apr. 1989, at 12; Sullivan, Human
Rights at the United Nations: The Implementation of Women's Rights: The Effectiveness of Ex-
isting Procedures, 29 IN BRIEF. Oct. 1990, at I (INTERNATIONAL LFAoUE FOR HUtAN RIGHTS).
1991]
CONNECTICUT LAW REV(EW
tary servitude.70
Indeed, the development of these more formal processes has sev-
eral important ramifications in promoting public education and helping
to redefine violence as a public issue. First, because of the availability
of these legal remedies, there are more proceedings in court, and the
participants, judiciary, court personnel, and public are educated about
the problem of domestic violence. Public participation in these disputes
may well have contributed to changing attitudes concerning the accept-
ability of violence against women.7 1 The media frequently focuses on
court cases, so there are many articles in newspapers and programs on
television about these cases.7 Analysis of the actual implementation of
these legal remedies, and the failure of the courts to enforce these pro-
visions, has been widely publicized in the many state gender bias re-
ports and has further expanded an educational process within the
states.73
The development of more formal processes also has been impor-
tant to battered women. A recent empirical study of battered women's
experiences in obtaining restraining orders in New Haven, Connecticut,
concluded that temporary restraining orders can help battered women
in ways other than increasing police responsiveness or deterring violent
men; "the process is (or can be) the empowerment. '74 The authors em-
phasize that "[t]his occurs when attorneys listen to battered women,
giving them time and attention, and when judges understand their situ-
ation, giving them support and courage. ' 75 However, they observe that
as important, although unfortunately less frequent, women's
empowerment can occur when men admit to what they have
done in a public forum. Such conversations and admissions
can transform the violence from a private familial matter, for
which many women blame themselves, to a public setting
70. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude, and the Thir-
teenth Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM (forthcoming 1992).
71. Resnik, Due Process: A Public Dimension, 39 U. FLA. L. REv, 405, 419 (1987).
72. However, more media has focused on cases involving battered women who have killed
their assailants than the "ordinary" case of a battered woman who cannot get into a shelter,
cannot get a restraining order, and may risk losing custody of her children for failing to protect
them from the batterer. Emphasis on the latter types of situations would squarely focus public
attention on the battering man and the failure of social responsibility.
73. See supra note 50.
74. Chaudhuri & Daly, Do Restraining Orders Help? Battered Women's Experience with
Maie Violence and Legal Process, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE
RESPONSE (E. Buzawa ed. forthcoming 1992).
75. Id.
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where men are made accountable for their acts."7 0
This study underscores the importance of legal representation, an-
other issue that reveals the tension between public and private. Al-
though battered women now have remedies that are available to them
"on the books," they have no assured access to lawyers to represent
them. Many battered women have limited resources and cannot afford
to hire a lawyer. Moreover, there are few lawyers who are sensitive to
their issues and problems. State statutory schemes do not provide for
counsel; indeed many of the protective order statutes specifically pro-
vide the option for battered women to represent themselves . Battered
women's advocates, formerly battered women or shelter workers, usu-
ally without formal legal training, are now the crucial link between
battered women and the legal system, and also frequently the child
welfare and social service systems. Battered women's advocates help
battered women to navigate the legal system, and assist them in every
facet of the process.78 Although battered women's advocacy has played
a critical role for battered women and has contributed a woman-cen-
tered form of representation, it is necessarily limited. Even the simplest
litigation concerning restraining orders may involve complex issues of
divorce, support and custody, and the lack of skilled legal representa-
tion effectively discriminates against battered women.
These examples illustrate the contradictions posed by more infor-
mal processes. The problem of lack of legal representation highlights
the dilemma that a more formal process would pose. Because counsel is
not provided, and has not been required by any of these statutes, bat-
tered women's advocates have been able to assist many battered women
who would not otherwise have been represented. If counsel were re-
quired, but not provided by the state, those battered women who can-
not pay for representation would be severely disadvantaged. Only the
provision of free counsel, knowledgeable about these issues, would
make a substantial difference. Thus, although in theory we might pre-
fer a more formal legal process for battered women, in practice, under
76. Id.
77. Most civil restraining order statutes have no provisions for counsel and are designed for
pro se applicants. Though legal advocates are bridging the representational gap in new and crea-
tive ways, battered women are still in desperate need of adequate legal representation because
civil restraining order litigation inevitably involves issues of custody, support, and visitation.
Schneider, supra note 30, at 51-52, 56-59. For a discussion of the problem of legal representation
in restraining order litigation, see P. FINN & S. CoLsoN, supra note 27, at 19.
78. Schneider, supra note 30, at 56-59.
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present conditions of scarce legal resources, it may not be realistic.
Finally, the complex interrelationship between private and public
can be seen within the battered women's movement itself. Until about
fifteen years ago, the terms "woman-abuse" and "battered woman" did
not exist. "Linguistically, it was classed with the disciplining of chil-
dren and servants as a 'domestic', as opposed to a 'political' matter."7,
Feminist activists in the battered women's movement named the prob-
lem in a different way; they claimed that battery was not a personal,
domestic problem but a systemic, political problem. Battering was not
the result of a particular man or woman's difficulties, but part of a
larger problem of male domination and female subordination.
Nancy Fraser describes the meaning of this redefinition in the fol-
lowing way:
Feminist activists contested established discursive boundaries
and politicized a previously depoliticized phenomenon. In ad-
dition, they reinterpreted the experience of battery and posited
a set of associated needs. Here they situated battered women's
needs in a long chain of in-order-to relations that spilled
across conventional separations of "spheres"; they claimed
that in order to be free from dependence on batterers, battered
women needed not just temporary shelter but also jobs paying
a "family wage", day care and affordable permanent
housing.80
The battered women's movement began with a clearly political
and public a.genda. Battered women were not viewed primarily as indi-
vidual victims but as potential feminist activists. Activists organized
battered women's shelters, which were woman-centered refuges and
sites of consciousness-raising. The organization of shelters was nonhier-
archical and egalitarian; many formerly battered women went on to
become counselors or advocates. Many battered women who had
blamed themselves developed a more political perspective, and began to
identify more with other women, rather than with the men who bat-
tered them."'
However, as the issue of woman-abuse became a more legitimate
79. Fraser, Struggle Over Needs: Outcome of a Socialist-Feminist Critical Theory of Late-
Capitalist Political Culture, in WOMEN, THE STATE, AND WELFARE 199, 213 (L. Gordon ed.
1990).
80. Id. at 213-14.
81. Id. at 214.
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political issue, and battered women's organizations and shelters began
to receive government funding, "a variety of new, administrative con-
straints ranging from accounting procedures to regulation, accredita-
tion and professionalization requirements were imposed. 8 2 Many orga-
nizations began to develop a service, rather than activist, perspective.
As a consequence, publicly funded shelters underwent a trans-
formation. Increasingly, they were staffed by professional so-
cial workers, many of whom had not themselves experienced
battery. Thus, a division between professional and client sup-
planted the more fluid continuum of relations that character-
ized the earlier shelters. Moreover, many social work staff
have been trained to frame problems in a quasi-psychiatric
perspective. This perspective structures the practices of many
publicly funded shelters even despite the intentions of individ-
ual staff, many of whom are politically committed feminists.
Consequently, the practices of such shelters have become more
individualizing and less politicized. Battered women tend now
to be positioned as clients. They are increasingly psychia-
trized, addressed as victims with deep, complicated selves.
They are only rarely addressed as potential feminist activists.
Increasingly, the language game of therapy has supplanted
that of consciousness raising. And the neutral scientific lan-
guage of "spouse abuse" has supplanted more political talk of
"male violence against women." Finally, the needs of battered
women have been substantially reinterpreted. The very far-
reaching earlier claims for the social and economic prerequi-
sites of independence have tended to give way to a narrower
focus on the individual woman's problems of "low self-
esteem."83
Thus, the battered women's movement itself has experienced the
tension between a more systemic "public" definition of the problem and
an individualistic "privatized" vision. Even within the movement, we
see internal tensions and pressures to move to a more privatized defini-
tion and experience of battering. Privacy encourages a focus on the in-
dividual, and avoidance of collective definition, systemic analysis and
social responsibility.
I have described elsewhere how the articulation of rights claims by
82. Id.
83. Id. at 214-15.
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the battered women's movement in both civil and criminal contexts
raised important questions for feminists about how to view the state,
and sharpened debate over the role of law in modifying the public/
private dichotomy.84 These debates have centered around the ideologi-
cal importance of criminalization in defining battering as a public
harm, and heightened the movement's analysis of reforms. These issues
have become more complex as more legal reforms have become availa-
ble. However, the tensions of privatization within the movement em-
phasize the need for recommitment to an analysis that links battering
to the broader problems of women, and identifies the need for social
and economic resources, education, jobs, child care, and housing. With-
out access to these resources, violence against women will endure.
As work on battered women moves forward the meanings of public
and private shift, but each new development reveals the ideological
constraints of privacy in a different form. This brings us full circle to
where we started.
C. The Affirmative Potential of Privacy for Battered Women
To this point, it may seem that Griswold has little potential for
battered women. The right of marital privacy protected in Griswold
seems to justify the argument for marital privacy that permits male
battering of women. Is Griswold significant only as the constitutional
articulation of the cloak of privacy that has historically maintained wo-
man abuse?
It is important to remember that the litigation in Griswold
emerged from a struggle for women's rights. 85 The articulation of a
right to privacy in Griswold resulted from "the patent suffering im-
posed by restrictive reproductive laws." '86 I want to suggest that the
problematic doctrine of privacy should be redrawn under the shaping
influences of the battered women's movement. Influenced by a sensitiv-
ity to gender, and informed by experience of woman abuse, privacy can
be reconstructed and reformulated.
The evolution of Justice Douglas's own privacy jurisprudence from
Griswold suggests the affirmative possibilities of privacy.87 In Griswold,
84. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights, supra note 7, at 642-48.
85. Catherine Roraback, one of the plaintiff's lawyers in Griswold, underscored this concept in
introductory remarks at the symposium.
86. Copelon, Losing the Negative Right of Privacy: Building Sexual and Reproductive Free-
dom, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 15, 38 (1990-1991).
87. Much of the following discussion of Justice Douglas' jurisprudence that follows from Grls-
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the Court confronted a constitutional challenge to Connecticut's birth
control statute, which prohibited the use of contraceptives and counsel-
ing concerning the use of contraceptives, by doctors who had been con-
victed under the statute. Douglas identified the harm resulting from
this statute as intrusion into the privacy and intimacy of the marital
relationship.88 He developed the right of privacy based on the associa-
tional aspects of marriage as an important relationship that requires
protection, and grounded it in a recognition of human intimacy and
connection as an important value.89 However, it is in his concurring
opinion in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton"0 that Justice Douglas devel-
oped his most expansive articulation of the right to privacy.
In Roe, Douglas developed three separate dimensions of these
rights of privacy and liberty. First, he described the "autonomous con-
trol over the development and expression of one's intellect, interests,
tastes and personality""' which he saw as absolutely protected by the
First Amendment against government interference. Second, he saw
"freedom of choice in the basic decisions of one's life respecting mar-
riage, divorce, procreation, contraception, and the education and up-
bringing of children." '92 Third, Douglas described "the freedom to care
for one's health and person, freedom from bodily restraint or compul-
sion, freedom to walk, stroll or loaf."'93 These rights, although funda-
mental, are subject to some control by the police power and are subject
to regulation on a showing of a compelling state interest.
Douglas then applied these dimensions of privacy and liberty to
the situation of a woman who faces state prohibitions on abortion. He
concluded that a woman is free to make the basic decision whether to
bear an unwanted child, for "childbirth may deprive a woman of her
preferred lifestyle and force upon her a radically different and unde-
sired future."9 4 He described in moving detail the harm that women
face:
[F]or example, rejected applicants under the Georgia statute
are required to endure the discomforts of pregnancy; to incur
wold is from Schneider, Commentary, supra note 8.
88. Id. at 179.
89. Id.
90. 410 U.S. 179, 209 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 211.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 213.
94. Id. at 214.
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the pain, higher mortality rate, and aftereffects of childbirth;
to abandon educational plans; to sustain loss of income; to
forgo the satisfactions of careers; to tax further mental and
physical health in providing child care; and, in some cases, to
bear the lifelong stigma of unwed motherhood, a badge which
may haunt, if not deter, later legitimate family relationships."
It is significant that Douglas developed these aspects of privacy
and liberty in the context of women's rights to reproductive control. In
Roe, Douglas expressed a vision of a privacy right as something far
more tied to an affirmative concept of liberty than a right to be left
alone, or than protection from intrusion into the marital bedroom, as in
Griswold. This view of privacy, as an aspect of liberty, is an expansive
concept that has a number of different dimensions. First, there is the
dimension of autonomy over the development and expression of one's
"intellect, interests, tastes and personality." Then there is the deci-
sional dimension-"freedom of choice in the basic decisions of one's
life respecting marriage, divorce, procreation, [and] contraception."
There is also freedom from intrusion, restraint, and compulsion, and
freedom to care for oneself and express oneself. We see the interrelated
dimensions of privacy: autonomy, decisional privacy, what some have
called restricted access privacy, and affirmative self-expression as as-
pects of the liberty that Douglas describes as part of the fourteenth
amendment. Liberty-freedom is the larger concept, within which these
aspects of privacy are subsumed.
Justice Douglas' affirmative view of privacy and liberty in his con-
curring opinion in Roe was a product of the massive educational pro-
cess concerning a woman's right to abortion that had gone on around
the country for several years with the growth of the women's move-
ment. In many cities around the country, women were coming forward
in courtrooms and meeting places to tell their stories. Women forced
the courts to confront the fact that every year women had abortions at
enormous physical and psychic cost. Justice Douglas' opinion directly
responded to the range of arguments presented in feminist briefs in
Roe. Feminist briefs in Roe argued broadly that reproductive choice
was central to women's equality both in allowing women to become full
persons and in achieving full participation in society. 96 The briefs also
linked the rights to reproductive control with women's autonomy and
95. Id. at 214-15.
96. This description is drawn from Copelon, supra note 21, at 314-15.
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ability to be sexual, and emphasized the disproportionate impact of
criminalization on the poor. They presented to the Court a full factual
and legal picture of the range of harms that women suffered as a result
of abortion restrictions. For example, the amicus curiae brief submitted
by Nancy Stearns of the Center for Constitutional Rights for New
Women Lawyers presented arguments concerning the prohibition of
abortion as an affirmative infringement of women's liberty, sex discrim-
ination and as cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amend-
ment.9 This brief especially focused on the practical impact of
criminalizing abortion on women's lives, and was filled with rich, tex-
tured descriptions of the harms that women suffered as a result of
prohibitions on abortion and the central role that reproductive choice
had for women's lives.98 Douglas' opinion, more specifically than the
majority opinion in Roe, echoed these themes, in particular, the harms
to women's liberty and freedom.
Justice Douglas' concurring opinion goes further than the majority
opinion in making an explicit link to liberty and in developing the more
affirmative dimensions of autonomy, self-determination, and self-ex-
pression. It also presages concerns with privacy as too narrow a ground-
ing for the right to abortion that feminist legal theorists have subse-
quently expressed. Douglas' affirmative view of privacy as a dimension
of liberty and his grounding of the abortion right on liberty in his opin-
ion in Roe resonates with critiques developed by feminist legal scholars
of the privacy right as the doctrinal basis for the abortion decision.
Feminist theorists have viewed as problematic the articulation of a
right to privacy, as opposed to liberty, as the doctrinal basis for the
abortion decision in Roe.99 Feminists have argued that the abortion
right should have been founded upon the concept of liberty, rather than
privacy, as it is women's freedom and autonomy that are at stake. Al-
though feminist theorists have understood that there are many dimen-
sions to privacy, such as decisionmaking, autonomy, self-determination
and human and sexual self-expression, privacy has been viewed as
problematic for the reasons previously discussed. The right of privacy,
a passive right that said the state could not intervene, was viewed in
97. Brief Amicus Curiae on behalf of New Women Lawyers, Women's Health and Abortion
Project, Inc., National Abortion Action Coalition 14-24, Roe v. Wade, 410 US. 113 (1973) and
Doe v. Balton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). I worked on this brief as a law student intern with Nancy
Stearns at the Center for Constitutional Rights for New Women Lawyers.
98. Id.
99. Copelon, supra note 21, at 314-16.
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contrast with the right to liberty, that emphasized the harms women
suffered if they could not get abortions and seemed to imply that the
state had an affirmative obligation to ensure that women can exercise
their freedom. Douglas' concurring opinion suggests the radical poten-
tial of the concept of privacy-articulating it as not only the right to be
let alone, but as affirmatively linked to liberty and the right to auton-
omy, self-expression and self-determination. The notion of women as
agents of their own lives is an important and powerful concept that
transcends the common experience of the concept of privacy. Unfortu-
nately, the radical potential of the concept of privacy has not been ac-
tualized by more recent decisions of the Court, such as Bowers v.
Hardwick,"'0 where the right to sexual autonomy and personal and
emotional self-realization was directly implicated. 10 1
The importance of this more affirmative dimension of privacy is
underscored by the problem of woman-abuse. The rationale of privacy
legitimates and supports violence against women; woman-abuse reveals
the violence of privacy. Privacy justifies the refusal of the state to inter-
vene, of judges to issue restraining orders, of neighbors and friends to
intervene or to call the police, of communities to confront the problem,
and of social workers to act. Yet when we look at the more affirmative
dimensions that Douglas articulates in Roe we can see the importance
of these perspectives in thinking about woman-abuse. Battered women
seek autonomy, freedom of choice with respect to the basic decisions of
life concerning intimate association, freedom from battering and coer-
cion, and freedom to be themselves. They seek the freedom to survive
free from violence. We need to begin to articulate these affirmative
claims as abortion activists did in Roe.
IV. CONCLUSION
The challenge is to develop a right to privacy which is not synony-
mous with the right to state noninterference with actions within the
family,'0 2 but which recognizes the affirmative role that privacy can
play for battered women. Feminist reconstruction of privacy should
seek to break down the dichotomy of public and private that has dis-
abled legal discourse and public policy in this area. Male battering of
women is a serious public problem for which we need to accept collec-
100. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
101. Copelon, supra note 21, at 319-20.
102. Eisler, Human Rights: Toward an Integrated Theory for Action, 9 HuM. RTs. Q. 287,
292-93 (1987).
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tive responsibility; it requires a dramatic program of mass public re-
education similar to the drunk driving campaigns over the last several
years. At the same time, while claiming woman-abuse as a public prob-
lem, we do not want to suggest that state intervention is always the
answer. Frank Michelman has observed that even if we understand that
the personal is political, this insight does not answer the question of the
appropriate boundaries of state intervention.1 0 3 Others have detailed
the ways in which state intervention will always be problematic for
women,104 and we can see this in the limitations of legal reforms and
the child welfare investigations of battered women on failure to protect
grounds.
However, we also do not want to reject the genuine values and
benefits of privacy for battered women. Thinking about privacy as
something that women who have been battered might want makes us
think about it differently. Battered women seek the material and social
conditions of equality and self-determination that make privacy possi-
ble. 0 5 Privacy that is grounded on equality, and is viewed as an aspect
of autonomy, that protects bodily integrity and makes abuse impermis-
sible, is based on a genuine recognition of the importance of per-
sonhood more true to the vision of privacy that Douglas evolved from
Griswold.106 Such a notion of privacy could challenge the vision of indi-
vidual solution, rather than social responsibility, for abuse. Conceived
differently, privacy could help keep women safe, not battered.
103. Michelman, supra note 20, at 1794.
104. See Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family. 18 U, MIcH. J.L REF. 835,
858-61 (1985).
105. See Copelon, supra note 86, at 44-50, for a discussion of privacy and equality.
106. For exploration of the concept of personhood, see Radin, Property and Personhood, 34
STAN. L. REv. 957 (1982); Frank Michelman's comment on Radin's work, supra note 20. made
me realize that personhood is the aspect of privacy that I am seeking to preserve for battered
women.
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